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Abstract
It has often been assumed that rational negotiators who achieve inefficient compromises
should accept Pareto improvements suggested by some external party, such as an expert,
mediator, or a computer system. Following this assumption an argument is made to give
legitimacy to efficient compromises generated by a negotiation support system or to
entice a party move to a Pareto improvement. The simplifications made in model
construction on the one hand and the very narrow and limited considerations of
rationality in present negotiation support systems on the other, suggest a different
approach to support. This approach is based on engaging users to a sound process and
confronting them with their inconsistencies rather than providing solutions or promoting
improvements.
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1. Introduction
Korhonen, Phillips, Teich and Wallenius (1998), in their letter to the Editor, observe
that people are often not willing to improve the compromises they have achieved
through negotiations and provide some possible explanations and remedies. In this note
we attempt to address several concerns raised in the letter and point the reader to
relevant literature. Acceptance of inefficient compromises has been researched from
different perspectives as we note in Section 2. There are many possible explanations and
some of them are presented in Sections 3 and 4. The type of experiment that has been
used may also provide some insights as indicated in Section 5. Implications for decision
and negotiation support are briefly discussed in Section 6 and a brief conclusion in
Section 7.
2. Evidences for inefficient compromises
The acceptance of inefficient compromises and the unwillingness to improve them are
phenomena that have been observed in many experiments (see, for example, Alemi, Fos
et al. 1990; Prasnikar and Roth 1992; Roth 1995; Weingart 1996). Different
interpretations are plausible and have been formulated on both the theoretical ground
(McClennen 1990; Varoufakis 1991; Kersten and Noronha 1998), as well as
behavioural and experiential. The latter includes widely published observations about
cognitive biases and limitations (Bazerman and Neale 1991; Neal and Bazerman 1991),
but also differences in peoples approach to, and understanding of, decision and
negotiation processes, and what constitutes an outcome of these processes (Adler and
Graham 1989; Hofstede 1989; Faure and Rubin 1993).
Since 1996 we have been conducting a large experiment on analyzing bilateral
negotiations between people from many cultures and with different educational and
professional backgrounds (Kersten and Noronha 1997). The negotiators use INSPIRE, a
Web-based NSS that allows for anonymous negotiation with the use of conjoint analysis
for utility construction, a messaging facility for argumentation, and a visualization
facility for the construction of a graph representing negotiation dynamics and history
(Kersten and Noronha 1997). Between December 1996 and March 1998 over 1000
people negotiated via INSPIRE; some 59% achieved a compromise and out of them
2only 46% achieved an efficient (Pareto-optimal) compromise. INSPIRE suggests
Pareto-improvements to the users who achieved a non-efficient compromise by
displaying up to five efficient compromises and invites users to continue negotiations.
Out of those who achieved non-efficient compromise only 18% wished to continue and
improve their results. That is, 82% of those who achieved an inefficient compromise did
not want to improve it.
There are several suggested reasons for negotiators not to prefer Pareto-improvements
(Korhonen, Phillips et al. 1998). These include the issue of fairness that has been
discussed in experimental economics (Bartos, Tietz et al. 1983; Tietz and Bartos 1983;
Thompson and Loewenstein 1992) and a possible dislike or distrust of a computer
generated outcome. This, in effect, may–according to the authors–provide an
explanation for the rejection of inefficient compromises:
“Technically speaking, these outside considerations could be interpreted as
underlying issues for the parties. Hence in the augmented space of issues, their
original settlement may, after all, have been Pareto optimal.” (Korhonen, Phillips
et al. 1998, p.2)
This statement may be critical to the discussion on inefficient compromises and also to
many discussions conducted in the MCDM/MCDA community including the MCDA
Manifesto (Bouyssou et al., 1993). Paradoxically, this statement may be seen as one
answer to all the questions posed by researchers who observe deviations from efficient
solutions and are uncomfortable, for some reason, with these deviations. This is because
if subjects (decision makers, negotiators) can provide any explanation a posteriori for
the selection of a particular compromise then the issue space can be modified so that
this compromise is efficient.
Korhonen et al. (1998) suggestion that the rejection of Pareto-improvements may be
countered with the introduction of an expert or a third party who designs an appropriate
incentive to steer the discussion into new directions. This is because an expert or a third
party changes both the context and the dynamics of the process and thus makes the
outcomes incomparable with a situation when none of them are present. It is these
context-dependent attributes that are critical but neglected issues in decision making.
3. Context-dependent attributes
Augmentation of the issue space is a phenomenon that often happens in negotiations
when some attributes (issues) are context dependent. These are the attributes that
describe the decision maker. They may be viewed criteria or soft constraints that are
related to the problem, process or the “world outside of the problem”. Examples of these
attributes are fairness, time pressure, social status, and empathy.
French (1986,  p.344), states that:
“The construction of the model decision maker as a reflection of me enables me
to explore and clarify my preferences and beliefs. Indeed, in many cases it
guides their evolution in that it encourages me to think about aspects of the
problem which hitherto I had not considered and, therefore, about which I have
no pre-existing feelings. … As I articulate my initial preferences and beliefs
during the construction of the model decision maker, my attention is drawn to
any inconsistency between these and the cannons of rationality.”
3The difference between the making of a single decision and negotiation is that in the
latter the preference articulation is revisited and attributes that at one point were not
relevant may later become critical.
The consideration of context-dependent attributes before the negotiation commences
may make little sense to the decision maker. This is because these attributes may
become present only in certain situations that are difficult to foresee and they need not
be related to the negotiation problem but to the personal and/or professional
characteristics of the negotiator. For example, a person may be distrustful of computers
in general, but the very fact that she agrees to negotiate using them implies their
acceptance. Only when and after a difficult negotiation the system proposes another
solution the distrust may resurface.
Context-dependent attributes are intrinsically linked with the situation in which one or
more negotiating parties find themselves. Assuming, for simplicity, that the negotiation
situation is described--at any point in time--only by attribute values and preferences, we
obtain that the value of a context-dependent attribute depends on other attribute values.
This implies that for negotiators it may be cognitively very difficult, if at all possible, to
specify the attribute and its salient levels (e.g., reservation levels) without experiencing
other attribute values. A person may clearly want to achieve a compromise that is fair
for both sides. We may also assume that, for a given problem, she is able to specify the
attributes on which fairness is defined. However, it may be impossible to define a
functional relationship between these attributes. This is because this person may be able
to define fairness only locally, i.e., for a given configuration of the values of other
attributes.
Decision making in general and negotiation in particular is a problem solving activity
(i.e., the choice of a decision) and a process involving resources and effort. Context
dependent attributes may depend on the process and its attributes and not solely on the
problem (alternatives) attributes. For example, fairness attribute may depend on the
initial openings (offers) made by both parties, the frequency of counter-offers, and the
concessions made by each side.
From the above examples it follows that context dependent attributes may reflect
psychological traits of decision makers and their belief and value systems. It is not often
that people change these traits and values and here we are not concerned with such
significant issues as learning and discovery. These traits however, are present but not
necessarily prominent. That is they play a role when a situation calls for it but may not
be visible in other situations.
4. Rationality
Korhonen et al. (1998) speculations that people through gaining work experience or
obtaining higher education are more likely to accept a Pareto improvement seem to have
its underlying reasons in their strive for economic rationality.  Their axion is--it appears-
-that economic rationality is a principle which people should apply in making decisions.
The collorary is that by rejecting Pareto improvements people violate the rationality
principle or vice versa. Rational negotiators have to reject a compromise they have
achieved and accept an alternative that yields higher utility value at least for one of
them. If they reject such an offer (suggested by a computer, mediator or third party)
they cannot be rational. We argue that this is not necessarily the case and that in fact the
4two concepts are only loosely related, and that they are valid principles for decision
making other than economic rationality.
According to Savage (1972), a rational decision maker is one who:
… has only one decision to make in his whole life. He must, namely, decide how
to live, and this he might in principle do once and for all.
Decision scientists following and including Savage have rightfully deemed this grand-
world problem unrealistic. Instead they focus on episodes; local and partial decisions
that they assume can be reasonably isolated from the reminder of the decision maker’s
lifetime of activity.
Since the most comprehensive criteria of rationality are expressed in terms of grand-
world problems, assessing the rationality of any individual (local) decision problem is
not an easy task. In many situations it cannot be reduced to the consideration of the
attributes of the decision problem and the preferences of the decision maker defined on
these attributes. This is the case with many decision made in social settings when people
interact and the results of these interactions have consequences beyond that episode.
Negotiations are a typical example of such decisions. One should not be surprised that
only rarely they can be isolated from the decision maker’s past and her/his projection of
the future.
In abstract, someone in agreement with the rationality principle means that she is
coherent with the principles she has chosen and applies in life. This coherence is the
essence of rationality (Wellman, 1995), as it links the many different and partial
decisions into one life-spanning decision. Coherence means that local decisions are not
contradictory with each other. Thus, employing the rationality principle may be
interpreted as using some global criteria in decision making.
The rejection of Pareto improvements implies that a person rejects a solution for which
some local criteria values are better than the solution accepted. Since it is the global
criteria that determine whether a person is rational, rejection of Pareto improvements
has little impact on rationality principle if at all.
It could be argued that a rational decision maker should formulate all criteria, including
global criteria, that are relevant to the problem at hand prior to choosing an alternative
decision. This may well be possible in narrow and well-defined problems, but it is
hardly possible in cognitively difficult problems that involve interactions between
people.
Consider a person who is and wants to be seen as being compassionate, and who is
entering a negotiation. She is asked by a decision analyst about the negotiation problem,
including decision attributes, criteria, reservation prices, BATNA, etc. All these
questions are posed in a social and historical vacuum. Being compassionate does not
enter the picture at all. However, when she interacts with her opponent and formulates
concessions, compassion may become an important criterion. Consequently, she may
make a very different decision than the one the decision analyst could foresee. For that
expert, the negotiator is not rational; she makes decisions violating earlier stated criteria
and possibly reservation prices or BATNA. People who know her well, however, see
her as being a rational decision maker. What is more, if she were to follow the analyst’s
advice, they would see her as being irrational. This is because she would then be
violating one of her own and accepted global values.
55. Experimenter and subject
Results of contextually relevant experiments, as the one proposed by Korhonen et al.
(1998) may be misleading. This is because they introduce context that is designed and
interpreted by experimenters but which may be perceived very differently by the
subjects. Behavioural, cultural and moral constraints and criteria may play roles that
were not recognized by the experimenter. For example, it is possible that some subjects
were uncomfortable with the idea of buying course credit points with Swiss chocolates
or dollars.
Assume that you feel pressured and therefore participate in negotiation. You believe
that once you have achieved a compromise the contract is fulfilled and you can do other
things. Now, you have achieved a compromise and are asked if you would rather choose
another alternative. The point is that while this new alternative may be better you may
want to finish the experiment as quickly as possible and for a variety of reasons. It has
been shown both experimentally and theoretically that time and outside options have
significant impact on negotiations (Rapoport, et al., 1995).
Setting contextually relevant negotiation experiments poses a danger that the
negotiation problem is considered relevant by the experimenter but not by the
negotiating subjects. Allowing the subjects to retain the negotiation settlement may also
pose the relevancy problem. For these reasons many negotiation experiments use either
an abstract problem or a case in which the subjects represent an organization. The
subjects may still be rewarded and the gains may depend on the compromise or lack of
thereof (Roth 1995).
6. Decision support
For years decision and negotiation support was done only via intermediaries; in-house
analysts or consultants. This was obvious when there were only a few computers; the
computer systems were difficult to use and the methods for decision analysis and
evaluation were not suitable to be used by decision makers (Finlay and Martin 1988).
Over the last few years, however, both methods and systems have changed; researchers
and system developers have made efforts to deliver DSS to decision makers. Despite
these efforts and contrary to the definitions of DSS, typically there is an intermediary
between a DSS and the decision maker (Anghern 1993; El-Najdawi and Stylianou 1993;
Finlay 1994). Perhaps the reasons for this situation may be found in a narrow
consideration of the role of support and in the interests of the intermediaries.
An intermediary is expected to learn not only about the decision problem but also the
decision maker and situation they face. The intermediary should not only be able to help
to select decision attributes, constraints, criteria, but also be competent in suggesting
what rationality principles to adopt. Construction and fine tuning of the model were the
obvious activities of the intermediary. However, they were also able to interpret the
solutions and discuss them and their implications with the decision maker. This process
led to the intermediary’s learning of who the decision maker is and what their needs are
both now and in the future. This leads to further fine tuning of the model so that it not
only described the decision problem but also incorporated certain salient characteristics
of the decision maker. Consequently, an efficient solution of the initial problem might
become infeasible and an inefficient solution may become efficient.
6If DSS were to be widely used by end users, that is if they were to support real decision
makers then the mode and role of support will have to change. The constructors of
methods and systems have to realize that they provide only very narrow and localized
support, and that their role is to build tools that help the users to understand the problem
and themselves. These tools need to provide support for the process of decision making
and not for solving decision problems. They need to be active participants in the process
(Anghern 1993; Rao, Sridhar et al. 1994). The main difference is the acknowledgement
that the user is the customer whose needs should be satisfied and that although the
system may be missing a significant portion of relevant information its utility is in
supporting the user. In that sense the objective of support is not to provide a solution
and much less in trying to direct the user into any specific solution. Instead, it is to
allow the user to compare solutions, construct scenario, easily modify problem
representation, and manage the decision process. In that sense the expectation is that the
system engages its user in a sound process, confronts him with his inconsistencies and
contradictions rather than providing a quick and easy solution. This view of the role of a
DSS or NSS is in line with Henig and Buchanan’s (1996) request to upgrade MCDM
methods.
7. Conclusion
While we concur on the salience of the issues raised by Korhonen et al. (1998), we have
argued for a very different role for the “expert” in DSS and NSS. We see the role as
being more to help the negotiator/decision-maker to understand the problem and
themselves. In contrast Korhonen, Phillips, Teich and Wallenius suggest a role based
more on giving legitimacy to efficient compromises generated by DSS or NSS or to
“design incentives to entice a party move to a Pareto improvement”. We see the clear
need for support that engages the user rather than one of promoting solutions.
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